The Trading Market Signals Private Credit Redemption Monitor tracks how the largest private credit funds sold to wealth clients are handling investor withdrawal requests as redemption demand outruns the quarterly limits written into these vehicles. As of August 31, 2026, the second quarter is closed and final. Robert A. Stanger & Co. puts repurchase requests at 12.4% of net asset value, the highest reading it has recorded, up from 10.4% in Q1, with sponsors fulfilling 38% of them and returning about $5.9 billion in the quarter and $12.7 billion year-to-date. By our calculation that leaves roughly $9.6 billion of Q2 requests unfilled. Three more funds opened Q3 tenders in the week of August 24, all at the standard 5% cap and none upsized. The early third-quarter reads point the other way: Golub’s GCRED cleared its July 29 tender in full at 4.8% of shares, and the first three NAV BDCs to report Q3 show requests at 4.6% of NAV against 7.9% for those same funds in Q2. A second market has now appeared alongside the gates. Cox Capital launched three unsolicited mini-tenders on July 14 for shares of gated funds at 15% to 25% below the funds’ own reported NAV, and every board named has told shareholders to refuse.
Redemption status by fund (2026 cycle, most recent gate)
| Fund (size) | Manager | Structure | Quarterly cap | Latest request | Outcome | NAV signal | As of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q3 tenders opened week of Aug 24 — Fidelity Private Credit Fund, Bain Capital Private Credit, T. Rowe Price OHA Select (OCREDIT) | Fidelity / Bain Capital / T. Rowe Price OHA | Non-traded BDC | 5% | Offers open, results pending | All three tendering the standard 5%, expiring Aug 31 and priced at Sept 30 NAV: Fidelity 2,710,510 shares (5% of 54.2M outstanding at Jun 30), Bain 2,195,257, OCREDIT 3,162,518. No upsized caps | — | Q3 2026 |
| Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED) | Blackstone | Non-traded BDC | 5% (upsized to 7% in Q1) | ~10% of shares in Q2 | Q1 requests of 7.9% were met in full only after roughly $400M of sponsor and employee capital went into a feeder (~$250M firm, ~$150M employees). At 10% in Q2 the fund returned to the 5% cap and prorated, describing the program as operating as designed | — | Q2–Q3 2026 |
| Golub Capital Private Credit Fund (GCRED) | Golub Capital | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 4.8% of shares (tender closed Jul 29) | Below the cap; met in full, per an August shareholder letter. Prior quarter drew 8.5% and was prorated at about 59% | — | Q3 2026 |
| Q3 early read — first three NAV BDCs reporting | — | Non-traded BDC | typ. 5% | 4.6% of NAV combined | Down from 7.9% for those same funds in Q2; two met 100% of requests, the third received none. Sample too small to call a trend | — | Q3 2026 |
| Blue Owl Technology Income Corp (OTIC) | Blue Owl | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 38.1% of shares (~$1.1B) | Capped at 5% on July 2, 2026; prorated (down from 40% prior quarter). Fund reported $1.3B of liquidity, about nine times the tender obligation | — | Jul 2026 |
| Blue Owl Credit Income Corp (OCIC) | Blue Owl | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 18.8% of shares ($3.6B) | Capped at 5% on July 2, 2026; prorated (down from 22% prior quarter). Combined Blue Owl requests ~$4.7B for a second straight quarter | — | Jul 2026 |
| Apollo Debt Solutions BDC | Apollo | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 16.8% of shares (~$2.4B) | Capped at 5% and prorated; largest request the fund has reported since its January 2022 launch. Closed a $514.9M CLO in the same window | — | Q2 2026 |
| Ares Strategic Income Fund (ASIF) | Ares | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 14.4% of NAV | Nearly three times the repurchase cap; prorated. Board told shareholders on July 21 to reject an unsolicited Cox Capital mini-tender for 450,000 Class I shares at $22.95, under 0.15% of the class | Cox bid ~15% below the May 31 NAV and ~14% below the June 30 NAV of $26.71 | Q2–Jul 2026 |
| HPS Corporate Lending Fund (HLEND) | HPS Investment Partners | Non-traded BDC | 5% | ~13.3% of shares | About 2.7 times the cap; prorated. Board unanimously rejected a Cox Capital mini-tender for 550,000 Class I shares on July 27, arguing it would move value from tendering shareholders to Cox and its performance fees. Booked $49.3M of realized losses on four restructured deals | Cox bid $18.40 against a $24.53 May 31 NAV, ~25% below | Q2–Jul 2026 |
| North Haven Private Income Fund (~$8B) | Morgan Stanley | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 11.6% of shares | Prorated at 43%, below the manager’s own guidance; Q1 had drawn 10.9% and met 45.8% (~$169M) | — | Q2 2026 |
| BCRED — Blackstone Private Credit Fund | Blackstone | Non-traded BDC | 5% | ~10% of shares (Q2 tender) | Prorated to the 5% cap; Q1 had cleared 7.9% (~$3.8B) at 100% | — | Q2 2026 |
| BlackRock Private Credit Fund (BDEBT) | BlackRock | Non-traded BDC | 5% | ~5.3% of shares | Exceeded the 5% cap for the first time since 2022 inception; prorated | — | Q2 2026 |
| Goldman Sachs Private Credit Corp | Goldman Sachs | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 3.24% of shares (Q2 tender) | Below the cap; tender fulfilled in full | — | Q2 2026 |
| Vista Credit Strategic Lending Corp | Vista Credit Partners | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 1.8% of shares | Demand fell sharply after the fund prorated the prior quarter | — | Q2 2026 |
| Oaktree Strategic Credit Fund | Oaktree | Non-traded BDC | 5% | 6.8% of shares (13.9M shares) | Expanded the cap; paid roughly $310M | — | Q1 2026 |
| Cliffwater Corporate Lending Fund (~$33B) | Cliffwater | Interval fund | 7% | 14% of shares | Gated at cap; 2x oversubscribed | — | Q1 2026 |
| Blue Owl Capital Corp II / OBDC II (~$1.6B) | Blue Owl | Non-traded BDC | Quarterly | Redemptions closed Feb 18, 2026 | Unsolicited tender (Cox/Saba) at $3.80; $1.4B loan sale | −34.9% to NAV | Feb–May 2026 |
| Category aggregate — non-traded BDCs (25 funds, 58 share classes) | — | Non-traded BDC | typ. 5% | 12.4% of NAV requested (highest on Stanger’s record; 10.4% in Q1) | 38% of requests fulfilled; ~$5.9B returned in Q2, >$12.7B YTD; ~$9.6B of Q2 requests unfilled (TMS calculation); net outflow ~$3.8B, second straight quarter; H1 redemptions exceeded fundraising by ~$5.6B | Public BDCs trade ~80% of NAV avg | Q2 2026 |
What is new in late August 2026?
Stanger’s final second-quarter numbers arrived, and they are the worst on its record for demand. Repurchase requests reached 12.4% of net asset value, up from 10.4% in the first quarter. Sponsors fulfilled 38% of them, returning about $5.9 billion in the quarter and $12.7 billion for the year through June 30. Net outflow was roughly $3.8 billion, the second consecutive quarter in which redemptions beat fundraising, and for the half year the gap runs to about $5.6 billion. New sales fell to their lowest quarterly level since 2020.
Put the two published figures together and a third one appears. If $5.9 billion represents 38% of what investors asked for, they asked for about $15.5 billion, which leaves roughly $9.6 billion unfilled in a single quarter. That is the number we would watch, with one caveat that matters: unfilled requests are not a standing queue. Most of these funds require investors to resubmit each quarter, so the $9.6 billion is a measure of unmet demand at a point in time, not a backlog that automatically rolls into the next tender. Whether it resubmits is exactly what the Q3 tenders will show.
The early Q3 evidence says a good part of it did not come back. Golub’s GCRED drew requests for 4.8% of shares in the tender that closed July 29, under its 5% cap, and met them in full, after prorating at about 59% on an 8.5% request the previous quarter. The first three NAV BDCs to report the third quarter show combined requests of 4.6% of NAV against 7.9% for those same funds in Q2, with two meeting every request and the third receiving none. That sample is too small to call a turn. It is consistent with the reading we set out in July: when investors expect proration, some of them over-request to secure a larger fill, and that reflex unwinds once the gates stop binding.
Where the sponsor backstop stops. Blackstone met BCRED’s record 7.9% first-quarter requests in full, but not organically. Roughly $400 million of Blackstone and employee capital went into a feeder fund to get there, about $250 million from the firm and $150 million from employees, alongside an upsized 7% offer. When second-quarter requests reached about 10% of shares, the firm did not repeat the mechanic. It held the 5% cap, prorated, and described the program as working as designed. Read the two quarters together and the largest sponsor in the category has drawn a visible line: it funded a 7.9% quarter and declined a 10% one. That is the closest thing an allocator has to a market price for discretionary sponsor support, and it is worth roughly $400 million for one quarter at one fund.
The Q3 sample is about to triple. Fidelity Private Credit Fund, Bain Capital Private Credit and the T. Rowe Price OHA Select Private Credit Fund each opened a 5% tender in the week of August 24, expiring August 31 and priced at net asset value as of September 30. Fidelity is offering to repurchase 2,710,510 shares, 5% of the 54.2 million outstanding at June 30; Bain 2,195,257 shares; OCREDIT 3,162,518. None upsized its cap and none announced sponsor capital alongside the offer, which is itself the signal. Their results will take the third-quarter sample from three funds to six, and will test whether the roughly $9.6 billion of unfilled second-quarter demand resubmits.
What is a gated share actually worth?
Until July the question was theoretical. A fund reports a net asset value, the gate stops you leaving at that value, and nobody publishes what someone would actually pay. Cox Capital Retail Secondaries Fund I has now answered it three times in one week, and Saba answered it once before.
| Fund | Bid per Class I share | Reported NAV | Discount | Gate pressure that quarter | Board response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blue Owl Capital Corp II (OBDC II) | $3.80 (Cox / Saba) | NAV per share | −34.9% | Redemptions closed entirely on Feb 18, 2026 | Fund sold $1.4B of loans |
| HPS Corporate Lending Fund (HLEND) | $18.40 | $24.53 (May 31, 2026) | −25.0% | ~13.3% requested against a 5% cap | Unanimous reject, Jul 27 |
| Ares Strategic Income Fund (ASIF) | $22.95 | ~$27.00 (May 31); $26.71 (Jun 30) | −15% / −14% | 14.4% requested against a 5% cap | Reject, Jul 21 |
| Apollo Debt Solutions (ADS) | Third tender in the same Jul 14 batch | — | — | 16.8% requested against a 5% cap | — |
Two cautions belong on that table. These are mini-tenders, deliberately sized under the 5% threshold that would trigger the full tender-offer rules, and each one covered about a tenth of a percent of the share class. No fund lost meaningful capital to them. And a discount buyer bids to make a return, so its price is not a valuation opinion, it is an offer.
What the table does show is the shape of the spread. The fund that closed redemptions outright drew the deepest bid at roughly 35% below NAV. The funds that are gating but still paying something drew 15% to 25%. The gate is what creates the discount, and the harder it binds, the wider the gap between the NAV an investor is told and the cash an investor could get today. Advisors holding these positions for clients with a real liquidity need should price that gap into the plan rather than the statement value.
What does the monitor track?
This page follows the funds at the center of the 2026 private credit redemption cycle: non-traded business development companies, interval funds, and tender-offer funds sold largely through wealth platforms. For each fund we record the contractual quarterly redemption cap, the most recent disclosed redemption request level, the outcome investors actually received, and any signal from net asset value (writedowns, traded discounts, or tender prices). Figures are sourced to named primary and secondary reporting and carry an explicit “as of” date. Figures we derive ourselves, such as the unfilled dollar value of quarterly requests, are labeled as TMS calculations with their inputs shown so any reader can reproduce them. We update the table as funds report new quarterly figures or disclose gate changes.
Has the redemption wave peaked?
The honest answer in August is that demand peaked in the second quarter on the data available, and that nobody yet knows whether the drop holds. Three arguments sit on the optimistic side: the proration reflex unwinding, Blue Owl’s July readings falling from 40% to 38.1% and from 22% to 18.8%, and OTIC reporting $1.3 billion of liquidity against a tender obligation roughly nine times smaller. Two sit on the other side. Fundraising at a 2020 low means the denominator keeps shrinking, so a stable dollar level of redemptions shows up as a rising percentage. And a fund that meets its cap is not the same as a fund that meets its investors: 38% fulfillment means most of the money that asked to leave in Q2 stayed, whether it wanted to or not.
Why are these funds gating in 2026?
The category grew to roughly $534 billion in limited-liquidity private asset funds by the end of 2025, much of it gathered through advisor channels. When redemption requests crossed the caps, managers chose to protect remaining investors from forced asset sales rather than meet every request. Carlyle chief executive Harvey Schwartz put the naming problem bluntly: the industry “did itself a bit of a disservice calling the vehicles semiliquid. We just should have called them ‘sometimes not liquid at all.'” That is now happening in practice. Bloomberg reported on July 23 that managers are retiring the “semi-liquid” label in favor of “conditional” or “periodic” liquidity, and PIMCO argued that caps do not fix the underlying mismatch between a daily-marketed promise and assets that trade in years. DBRS Morningstar reported private credit downgrades outpacing upgrades by three or four to one, and Partners Group warned that default rates could double from around 2.5%. Morningstar research indicates investors need a seven-to-ten-year commitment to earn even a 2% yield premium over public debt markets. A repurchase surge reflects investor sentiment and reduced appetite for illiquid wrappers; on its own it is not evidence of credit deterioration in the underlying loans.
What it means for advisors
The gate mechanics that looked theoretical in the marketing have now been tested in public for three quarters. Our full analysis of the pullback, including the liquidity-queue math and the way the same banks selling these funds are protecting their own balance sheets, is in Morgan Stanley fills 45.8% of private credit redemptions as the banks pull back. For the case that built private credit into advisor portfolios in the first place, see our coverage of interval funds crossing $277 billion and public-private model portfolios. For the Q2 read on whether the wave has peaked, and why met caps are not the same as returning demand, see did the redemption wave peak? For what happens when these funds start appearing inside retirement plan menus, see the liquidity factor sponsors must document.
Last updated August 31, 2026. This monitor is provided for information only and is not investment advice. Figures are compiled from public reporting and fund disclosures and are accurate as of the dates shown; reliance on any information is at the reader’s sole risk.